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Abstract
In February 2009, the International Court of Justice rendered a judgment delimiting a maritime 
area of the Black Sea between Romania and Ukraine. The very next month, Indonesia and 
Singapore concluded a treaty delimiting their maritime boundary in the western part of the Strait 
of Singapore. Although these two delimitations occurred by different means (adjudication and 
negotiation), years later, they raise the same question: can a subsequent event move a maritime 
boundary? As a matter of lex lata, the answer is probably “no”. As a matter of lex ferenda, 
however, this Article questions whether the law governing land boundaries should also apply to 
maritime boundaries in light of key differences between land and maritime boundaries.
Keywords: Maritime boundaries, delimitation treaty,  uti possidetis, natural prolongation-
based approach,  stability of borders.  
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“Chile seems to start from the assumption of the absolute immobility of a 
frontier as a condition of its validity. Nothing in this world is completely 
immobile. Cicero recognized this long ago when he said of material things: 
Omnia alia incerta sunt, caduca, mobilia. . . Similarly, Thomas à Kempis, 
in a classical work of Christian mysticism, meditates on the things of this 
world and sees them passing sicut nubes, quasi naves, velut umbras. . .”1
I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2009, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rendered a 
judgment delimiting a maritime area of the Black Sea between Romania 
and Ukraine.2 The very next month, Indonesia and Singapore concluded 
1   Application for Revision and Subsidiary Interpretation of the Award of 21 Octo-
ber 1994 Submitted by Chile (Argentina/Chile), Decision, 22 RIAA 151 (13 October 
1995), para. 53.
2   Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, [2009] 
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a treaty delimiting their maritime boundary in the western part of the 
Strait of Singapore.3 Although these two delimitations occurred by 
different means (adjudication and negotiation), years later, they raise 
the same question: can a subsequent event move a maritime boundary?
In the case of the Black Sea, the subsequent event is none other 
than Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2010. As the Court 
made clear in its judgment, it had considered the coast of Crimea as 
part of Ukraine’s coast in drawing the delimitation line.4 Assuming, for 
the sake of this hypothetical, that Russia’s annexation of Crimea was 
lawful, what would happen to the delimitation line established by the 
ICJ judgment? Would it remain valid? Would it have to move? Would 
the judgment simply become null and void?
In the case of the Strait of Singapore, the subsequent event is the 
sinking of Pulau Nipa (Nipa Island). When concluding the delimitation 
treaty, the parties had considered Pulau Nipa to form part of Indonesia’s 
baseline in drawing the delimitation line.5 Assume, once again for the 
sake of the hypothetical, that rising sea levels have changed the legal 
status of Pulau Nipa such that it can no longer form part of Indonesia’s 
baseline. What would happen to the delimitation line established by the 
treaty? Would it remain in force? Would it have to move? Would the 
treaty simply become invalid?
As a matter of lex lata, the answers to these questions are not entirely 
clear. One could make a strong argument that the Black Sea judgment 
would remain valid, though it would of course only be binding on 
Romania and Ukraine, and would not prejudice any maritime claims of 
Russia in the Black Sea. One could also make a strong argument that 
the Strait of Singapore treaty would remain in force. Nevertheless, one 
cannot help but notice the absurdity of the situations. The Black Sea 
ICJ Reports 61 (3 February 2009).
3   Treaty between the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of Singapore relating 
to the delimitation of the territorial seas of the two countries in the western part of the 
Strait of Singapore (signed 10 March 2009, entered into force 30 August 2010), 2713 
UNTS 163.
4   Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, [2009] 
ICJ Reports 61 (3 February 2009), pp. 94, 102, 114, paras. 168, 214-216.
5   Lilian Budianto, “Indonesia restores key maritime baseline of Nipah Island: For-
eign Ministry”, The Jakarta Post (6 February 2009). 
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delimitation line would be based on an outdated geopolitical scenario, 
and the Strait of Singapore treaty would be based on an outdated 
baseline. The question thus arises: can subsequent events potentially 
justify the movement of maritime boundaries?
The Article is organized as follows. Section II explains how and 
why the law governing boundaries makes it very difficult for subsequent 
events to move boundaries. Section III then explains why, for policy 
reasons, it should be easier to move maritime boundaries than land 
boundaries. Section IV examines four subsequent events that could 
potentially justify the movement of maritime boundaries. Section V 
then concludes the Article with some normative observations.
II. MOVING BOUNDARIES
A. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The law governing boundaries must balance two policies that 
promote international peace and security: stability and adaptability. On 
the one hand, international boundaries must be stable; otherwise, States 
may freely claim that a boundary should move for one reason or another, 
leading to conflict in the border area. On the other hand, international 
boundaries must be adaptable; otherwise, States may have greater 
reason to challenge the legitimacy of an outdated boundary, once again 
leading to conflict in the border area. Both the stability and adaptability 
of boundaries are critical to international peace and security.
The extent to which the law governing boundaries favours stability 
or adaptability can be seen in the way it deals with subsequent events, in 
particular, the extent to which subsequent events can move boundaries. 
If the law were to favour stability, then it would be relatively difficult 
for subsequent events to move boundaries. If the law were to favour 
adaptability, then it would be relatively easy for subsequent events to 
move boundaries.
B. LEGAL RULES
At the present moment, the law governing boundaries favours 
stability over adaptability. This can be seen from the fact that it is very 
difficult for subsequent events to move boundaries, a fact that is evident 
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when looking at the three main types of boundaries: treaty boundaries 
(boundaries established by treaty); adjudicated boundaries (boundaries 
established by judicial decision); and inherited boundaries (boundaries 
inherited from colonial boundaries).
For treaty boundaries, the fundamental principle is pacta sunt 
servanda: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith.”6 There are, of course, 
exceptions to this principle. In particular,  Article 62 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides that a subsequent 
event that amounts to a “fundamental change of circumstances” may 
be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty.7 
Nevertheless, there is an exception to the exception. Article 62(2)(a) 
provides that “[a] fundamental change of circumstances may not be 
invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty ... 
[i]f the treaty establishes a boundary”.8 As a result, under the VCLT, a 
fundamental change of circumstances cannot move a treaty boundary. 
The inclusion of this exception was no accident. The International Law 
Commission (ILC) noted in its Commentary to the Draft Articles on 
the Law of Treaties that the exception is meant to prevent the ground 
of fundamental change of circumstances from becoming “a source of 
dangerous frictions”.9 In other words, the Commission was afraid that 
States could freely invoke a fundamental change of circumstances to 
disrespect treaty boundaries, leading to border conflicts. The ICJ has 
stressed the importance of the stability of treaty boundaries, noting in 
Libya/Chad: “Once agreed, the boundary stands, for any other approach 
would vitiate the fundamental principle of the stability of boundaries, 
6   Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (opened for signature 23 May 1969, en-
tered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT). Although many States are 
not parties to the VCLT, many of the Convention’s provisions are widely considered 
to reflect customary international law.
7   Ibid., art. 62.
8   Ibid., art. 62(2)(a). This provision, however, has not been accepted by all States. 
See Malcolm N. Shaw and Caroline Fournet, “Article 62”, in Olivier Corten and 
Pierre Klein (eds.), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary 
1411 (OUP 2011), paras. 20-22.
9   International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Com-
mentaries (1966), 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 187 (1966), p. 
259, cmt. 11.
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the importance of which has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court 
….”10
For adjudicated boundaries, the fundamental principle is res judicata: 
“[A] final adjudication by a court or tribunal is conclusive.”11 Once 
again, however, there are exceptions to this principle. For example, for 
ICJ judgments, a State can seek revision of an ICJ decision based upon 
the discovery of a fact previously unknown to the State.12 As another 
example, for arbitral awards, a State can seek annulment of the award 
before a competent court or tribunal. Nevertheless, neither of these 
cases allows for a subsequent event to move a boundary. Applications 
for revision before the ICJ must be based on a fact previously unknown 
to the State seeking the revision, and arbitral awards can be annulled 
only on, generally speaking– procedural grounds. In short, the principle 
of res judicata prevents subsequent events from moving adjudicated 
boundaries.
For inherited boundaries, the fundamental principle is uti possidetis: 
newly independent States must respect “the territorial boundaries at the 
moment when independence is achieved”.13 In cases where the territorial 
boundaries are mere delimitations between different administrative 
divisions or colonies subject to the same sovereign, “the application of 
the principle of uti possidetis result[s] in administrative boundaries being 
transformed into international frontiers in the full sense of the term”.14 
In applying this principle, the Chamber of the ICJ in Burkina Faso/
Mali affirmed the policy considerations behind it. The Chamber noted 
that the principle’s “obvious purpose is to prevent the independence 
and stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles 
provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of 
the administering power.”15 It further noted that “[a]t first sight this 
10   Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), Judgment (3 February 1994), para. 72.
11   William S. Dodge, “Res Judicata”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public Interna-
tional Law (January 2006), para. 1.
12   Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 61; International Court of Justice, 
Rules of Court, art. 99; Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, art. 61; 
Permanent Court of International Justice, Rules of Court, art. 78.
13   International Court of Justice, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), Judgment, 
[1986] ICJ Reports 554 (22 December 1986), para. 23.
14   Ibid.
15   Ibid., para. 20.
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principle conflicts outright with another one, the right of peoples to self-
determination[;] however, the maintenance of the territorial status quo 
in Africa is often seen as the wisest course”.16 International law thus, for 
practical reasons, promotes the stability of boundaries at the expense of 
other interests and values of the international community.
In summary, it is very difficult for subsequent events to move 
boundaries. The principle of pacta sunt servanda and Article 62(2)(a) 
of the VCLT make it difficult to move treaty boundaries, the principle 
of res judicata makes it difficult to move adjudicated boundaries, 
and the principle of uti possidetis makes it difficult to move inherited 
boundaries.
III. MOVING MARITIME BOUNDARIES
As a matter of lex lata, the law governing boundaries governs 
both land boundaries and maritime boundaries. There is no question 
that the principles of pacta sunt servanda and res judicata apply to, 
respectively, treaties establishing maritime boundaries and judicial 
decisions establishing maritime boundaries. As for Article 62(2)(a) of 
the VCLT, the text makes no distinction between land and maritime 
boundaries,17 and in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf the ICJ confirmed 
that the exception applies to continental shelf boundaries.18 Finally, 
although there has been some controversy over the applicability of the 
principle of uti possidetis to maritime boundaries,19 courts and tribunals 
generally agree that it applies.20
16   Ibid., para. 25.
17   VCLT (note 6), art. 62(2)(a).
18   Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, [1978] ICJ Reports 
3 (19 December 1978), para. 85.
19   See eg Delimitation of Maritime Boundary Between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal 
(Guinea-Bissau/Senegal), Dissenting Opinion of Mohammed Bedjaoui, 20 RIAA 154 
(31 July 1989), paras. 24-26; Suzanne Lalonde, Determining Boundaries in a Con-
flicted World: The Role of Uti Possidetis (2002), pp. 133-134.
20   See eg Delimitation of Maritime Boundary Between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal 
(Guinea-Bissau/Senegal), Decision, 20 RIAA 119 (31 July 1989), paras. 63-65; Ar-
bitration Under the Arbitration Agreement Between the Government of the Republic 
of Croatia and the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Signed on 4 November 
2009 (Croatia/Slovenia), PCA Case No. 2012-04, Final Award (29 June 2017), para. 
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As a matter of lex ferenda, however, one can question whether 
these principles should equally apply to maritime boundaries. After all, 
Article 62(2)(a) of the VCLT and the principle of uti possidetis were 
probably designed and developed with land boundaries in mind.21 
On a theoretical level, in order to assess whether the law governing 
maritime boundaries should be any different from the law governing 
land boundaries, one must return to the policy considerations discussed 
in Section II.A: stability and adaptability.
The concern for stability, although important for both land and 
maritime boundaries, is arguably more important for land boundaries 
than it is for maritime boundaries. This is because in the context of land 
boundaries, there can be people permanently living in the disputed area. 
If the boundary is not stable, then there could be serious conflicts—
potentially armed conflicts—with the residents of the disputed area, as 
well as the local and national governments supporting them. On the 
other hand, in the context of maritime boundaries, it is far less common 
for people to permanently reside in a maritime area (though there are, 
of course, maritime areas to which people regularly go, such as fishing 
grounds). As a result, eventhough conflicts could arise and indeed have 
arisen in maritime areas, particularly in resource-rich areas, they are 
far less common and dangerous than the conflicts that could arise in 
disputed land territory since it is rare for people to permanently live in 
maritime areas.
The concern for adaptability, on the other hand, is arguably more 
important for maritime boundaries than it is for land boundaries. This 
is for two reasons. The first reason is that land boundaries are based on 
history,22 which subsequent events cannot change, whereas maritime 
boundaries are based on geography,23 which subsequent events can, 
886; Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua 
intervening), Judgment, [1992] ICJ Rep 351 (11 September 1992), para. 385; Territo-
rial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea 
(Nicaragua v. Honduras), [2007] ICJ Rep 659 (8 October 2007), para. 156.
21   For a history of the principle of uti possidetis, see Lalonde (note 19), pp. 10-60.
22   The determination of a land boundary by a court or tribunal is generally based on 
past treaties, the principle of uti possidetis, and effectivités, all of which are historical 
in nature.
23   See below Section IV.A.
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in certain circumstances, change.24 The second reason is that the law 
governing land boundary delimitation is well established, whereas the 
law governing maritime boundary delimitation has evolved significantly 
over the past few decades, and continues to evolve today.25 For these 
two reasons, the delimitation of a maritime area could produce a 
different result depending on when the delimitation is effected. That is, 
the result of a delimitation effected today could be different from the 
result of a delimitation of the same maritime area effected thirty years 
ago. And these two results could also be different from the result that 
would be produced by a delimitation of the same maritime area effected 
thirty years from now. As a result, there is arguably a greater need 
for maritime boundaries to be adaptable, such that States who would 
benefit from a re-delimitation today would not, for example, complain 
about the legitimacy of an older, outdated delimitation.
This assertion, however, is relative, not absolute. That is, it is 
not the position of the present author that maritime boundaries must 
constantly change to conform to new geographical situations and new 
developments in maritime delimitation law. Rather, it is merely noted 
that, compared to land boundaries, there is greater justification for 
allowing maritime boundaries to adapt to new circumstances.
The exact means by which the two aforementioned types of 
subsequent events (changes in geography and changes in maritime 
delimitation law) can impact the delimitation of a maritime area is the 
subject of the next Section.
IV. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS
This Section examines how four subsequent events can impact the 
result of a maritime delimitation. In order to understand these impacts, 
however, one must understand the maritime delimitation process. As 
a result, this Section first provides a brief summary of the maritime 
delimitation process (Section IV.A). It then examines the four subsequent 
events in turn. The first three events are changes in geography: changes 
in coastal land sovereignty (Section IV.B); changes in river courses 
24   See below Sections IV.B to IV.D.
25   See below Section IV.E.
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(Section IV.C); and changes in sea levels (Section IV.D). The fourth 
event is changes in maritime delimitation law (Section IV.E). Notably, 
the Article is not necessarily advocating that any or all of these changes 
should necessarily justify moving maritime boundaries. Rather, the 
Article merely wishes to bring attention to these four subsequent events.
A. MARITIME DELIMITATION
Articles 15, 74, and 83 of UNCLOS govern the delimitation of, 
respectively, the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 
and the continental shelf.26 They do not, however, specify the precise 
method by which States, courts, or tribunals should delimit maritime 
boundaries. Article 15 provides that “neither of the two States is entitled 
... to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line”, but notes that 
“[t]he above provision does not apply ... where it is necessary by reason 
of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial 
seas of the two States in a way whit is at variance therewith”.27 Articles 
74 and 83 are even less helpful. They provide that in, respectively, the 
EEZ and the continental shelf, the delimitation “shall be effected by 
agreement on the basis of international law ... in order to achieve an 
equitable solution”.28
Despite this ambiguity, at least in the context of the EEZ and the 
continental shelf, international courts and tribunals generally follow the 
so-called “three-stage approach” first articulated by the ICJ in Black 
Sea.29 As one leading commentary notes, “[t]he jurisprudence since the 
Black Sea case has accorded overwhelming primacy to this three-stage 
approach in EEZ and continental shelf delimitation”.30
In the first stage, the court or tribunal draws a provisional 
equidistance line.31 This requires the identification of the “relevant 
26   United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (opened for signature 10 De-
cember 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994), 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS), arts. 
15, 74, 83.
27   Ibid., art. 15.
28   Ibid., arts. 74(1), 83(1).
29   Inrernational Court of Justice, Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania 
v. Ukraine), Judgment, [2009] ICJ Reports 61 (3 February 2009), paras. 115-122.
30   Stephen Fietta and Robin Cleverly, A Practitioner’s Guide to Maritime Boundary 
Delimitation (OUP 2016), p. 54.
31   International Court of Justice, Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. 
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coasts” of the two States, the “relevant area” to be delimited, as well 
as the “base points” on the coasts of the two States, which are used 
to construct the equidistance line. It is not clear, however, what can 
constitute a “base point”. Article 15 of UNCLOS suggests that the base 
points are “the nearest points on the baselines”.32 The baselines, in turn, 
are the lines from which maritime entitlements are to be drawn.33 The 
normal baseline of a coast is the low-water line along the coast, but the 
baseline can also be drawn with reference to islands,34 rocks,35 low-tide 
elevations,36 reefs,37 roadsteads,38 harbour works,39 and can furthermore 
be drawn as a straight line across deeply indented coastlines,40 mouths 
of rivers,41 and bays.42 To complicate matters, Articles 74 and 83 of 
UNCLOS do not specify that the base points for the EEZ and continental 
shelf are necessarily the nearest points on the baselines. Indeed, the 
ICJ in Black Sea observed that the determination of the baseline for 
measuring the breadth of the EEZ and the continental shelf, on the 
one hand, and the identification of the base points for delimiting the 
EEZ and the continental shelf, on the other hand, are “two different 
issues”.43 As a result, although islands generally have baselines from 
which maritime entitlements can be drawn,44 courts and tribunals have 
disregarded potential base points on islands in many cases, including 
Ukraine), Judgment, [2009] ICJ Reports 61 (3 February 2009), para. 116. The ICJ in 
Black Sea distinguished between “equidistance lines” for adjacent coasts and “median 
lines” for opposite coasts. Ibid. For simplicity, this Article refers to both as “equidis-
tance lines”.
32   UNCLOS (note 26), art. 15.
33   Ibid., arts. 3, 57, 76(1).
34   Fietta and Cleverly (note 30), p. 33.
35   Ibid.
36   UNCLOS (note 26), art. 13(1).
37   Ibid., art. 6.
38   Ibid., art. 12.
39   Ibid., art. 11.
40   Ibid., art. 7.
41   Ibid., art. 9.
42   Ibid., art. 10(5).
43   International Court of Justice, Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania 
v. Ukraine), Judgment, [2009] ICJ Reports 61 (3 February 2009), para. 137.
44   UNCLOS (note 26), art. 121.
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Libya/Malta,45 Eritrea/Yemen,46 Black Sea,47 Bangladesh/Myanmar,48 
and Nicaragua v. Colombia.49
In the second stage, the court or tribunal “consider[s] whether there 
are factors calling for the adjustment or shifting of the provisional 
equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable result”.50 These 
factors, commonly referred to as “relevant circumstances”, are 
primarily geographic.51 Relevant circumstances include, for example, a 
concave coastline that produces a cut-off effect, a disparity in the length 
of the two States’ relevant coasts, and maritime features that produce a 
disproportionate distorting effect on the equidistance line.52
In the third stage, the court or tribunal “verif[ies] that the line ... does 
not, as it stands, lead to an inequitable result by reason of any marked 
disproportion between the ratio of the respective coastal lengths and 
the ratio between the relevant maritime area of each State by reference 
to the delimitation line”.53 This standard of “marked disproportion” is 
quite high. As the Court held in Nicaragua v. Colombia, the purpose of 
the third stage is merely “to ensure that there is not a disproportion so 
gross as to ‘taint’ the result and render it inequitable”.54 In fact, no court 
or tribunal has ever made an adjustment to the delimitation line at this 
45   Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), Judgment, [1985] ICJ Reports 13 (3 June 1985), 
para. 64.
46   Permanent Court of Arbitration, Sovereignty and Maritime Delimitation in the 
Red Sea (Eritrea/Yemen), PCA Case No. 1996-04, Second Stage (Maritime Delimita-
tion), Award (17 December 1999), paras. 147-148.
47   Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, [2009] 
ICJ Reports 61 (3 February 2009), para. 149.
48   International Tribunal on The Law of The Sea, Dispute Concerning Delimitation 
of the Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal 
(Bangladesh/Myanmar), ITLOS Case No. 16, Judgment (14 March 2012), para. 265.
49   International Court of Justice, Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Co-
lombia), Judgment (19 November 2012), para. 202.
50   International Court of Justice, Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania 
v. Ukraine), Judgment, [2009] ICJ Reports 61 (3 February 2009), para. 120.
51   Fietta and Cleverly (note 30), pp. 66-67.
52   Ibid., pp. 67-68.
53   International Court of Justice, Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania 
v. Ukraine), Judgment, [2009] ICJ Reports 61 (3 February 2009), para. 122.
54   International Court of Justice, Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Co-
lombia), Judgment, [2012] ICJ Reports 624 (19 November 2012), para. 242.
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third stage of the process because of disproportionality.55
B. CHANGES IN COASTAL LAND SOVEREIGNTY
The first subsequent event that can impact the result of a maritime 
delimitation is a change in sovereignty over a coastal land area, be 
it continental or insular. To determine the impact of a such a change 
on a State’s boundaries, one would ordinarily turn to the law of State 
succession. As the Chamber of the ICJ held in Burkina Faso/Mali, “[t]
here is no doubt that the obligation to respect pre-existing international 
frontiers in the event of a State succession derives from general 
international law”.56 Applying this rule to land boundaries is simple: 
the boundaries of the predecessor State simply become the boundaries 
of the successor State. Applying the rule to maritime boundaries, 
however, can be much more complicated. If the coastal land area in 
question is not adjacent to any other coastal land area belonging to the 
predecessor State or the successor State, then the maritime boundaries 
of the predecessor State would probably simply become the maritime 
boundaries of the successor State. If, however, the coastal land area 
in question is adjacent to other coastal land area belonging to the 
predecessor State or the successor State, then the impact of the change 
in sovereignty on maritime boundaries is far less certain. The reason 
is that the change in sovereignty can impact the delimitation process 
in many different ways. In fact, the change in sovereignty can impact 
the delimitation process at all three stages of the three-stage process 
outlined above.
In the first stage of the process, the change in sovereignty could 
affect the identification of the “relevant coasts” of the two States because 
the predecessor State would have a shorter coast whereas the successor 
State would have a longer coast. This change in the “relevant coasts” 
would subsequently impact the identification of the “relevant area” 
and the “base points”, thereby ultimately impacting the provisional 
equidistance line. In the second stage, the change in sovereignty could 
affect the existence of relevant circumstances. It could, for example, 
create or remove a cut-off effect and/or a disparity in the lengths of the 
55   Fietta and Cleverly (note 30), p. 603.
56   International Court of Justice, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), Judgment, 
[1986] ICJ Reports 554 (22 December 1986), para. 24.
Peter Tzeng
147
two States’ relevant coasts. A change in sovereignty over a maritime 
feature could also produce or eliminate a disproportionate distorting 
effect on the equidistance line. In the third stage, the change in 
sovereignty could create or remove a marked disproportion because of 
the potential changes in the ratio of the respective coastal lengths and/
or the ratio of the relevant maritime areas of the two States.
Take, for example, the Crimea situation presented in the introduction. 
Assuming that Russia’s annexation of Crimea was lawful, and the ICJ 
were asked to delimit the maritime boundary between Romania and 
Ukraine once again, how would the maritime delimitation line change? 
The law of State succession is insufficient to answer this question. One 
cannot simply say that Russia inherits the part of Ukraine’s maritime 
area in the Black Sea “belonging” to Crimea because the ICJ did not 
make clear which part of Ukraine’s maritime area belongs to Crimea as 
opposed to the rest of Ukraine. One also cannot simply say that the line 
divides Romania’s maritime entitlements, on the one hand, and Ukraine 
and Russia’s maritime entitlements (which have yet to be delimited), 
on the other. The reason is that the ICJ had taken the coastal land area 
of Crimea into account when effecting the delimitation.57 In particular, 
the Court had treated the Crimean coast as part of Ukraine’s “relevant 
coast”,58 which impacted the Court’s identification of the “relevant area”59 
and Ukraine’s “base points”,60 ultimately impacting the provisional 
equidistance line.61 The Court had also taken the Crimean coastline into 
account in the second62 and third63 stages of the delimitation process. As 
a result, it would be very difficult—perhaps impossible—to determine 
with certainty what the impact of the annexation would be on the 
maritime delimitation line if the ICJ were to draw it again.
In summary, a change in sovereignty over a coastal land area, be it 
57   International Court of Justice, Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania 
v. Ukraine), Judgment, [2009] ICJ Reports 61 (3 February 2009), pp. 94, 102, 114, 
paras. 168, 214-216.
58   Ibid., p. 94.
59   Ibid., p. 102.
60   Ibid., p. 114.
61   Ibid.
62   Ibid., para. 168.
63   Ibid., paras. 214-216.
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continental or insular, could impact the result of a maritime delimitation 
in many different ways. If the law does not allow the maritime boundary 
to adapt to such a subsequent event, then States could challenge the 
legitimacy of the maritime boundary line.
C. CHANGES IN RIVER COURSES
The second event is a change in the course of a river. Aside from 
manmade causes, the course of rivers may naturally change because 
of weathering, erosion, deposition, as well as the movement of the 
Earth’s tectonic plates.64 Recent research has revealed that “well over 
one-third of the total length of international [land] boundaries follow 
rivers or streams that are inherently dynamic natural features”.65 In such 
cases, disputes may arise between States as to whether the current land 
boundary should follow the current course of the river or stream, or 
follow the course of the river or stream at the time of the establishment 
of the boundary.66 In theory, the States have the right to make such a 
decision ex-ante. As the arbitral tribunal in Laguna del Desierto held:
[O]nce the frontier has been determined on a moving glacier or 
along a river whose thalweg shifts its course, it can happen that the 
frontier follows the changes in the ice-field or the thalweg of the river or 
that it remains fixed. The option is open for the parties to agree that the 
frontier shall follow the shifts of the glacier or thalweg or to “fix” the 
frontier at the moment when it is delineated. This is done by indicating 
the geographical coordinates of the points which make up the frontier 
line.67
It thus follows that in cases where a treaty, judgment, or award 
establishing a boundary expressly states that the land boundary should 
always follow the course of the river, then the boundary undoubtedly can 
change overtime. For example, in its 2003 Demarcation Instructions, 
64   See Sean D. Willett and others, “Dynamic Reorganization of River Basins”, Sci-
ence, Vol. 343, No. 6175 (7 March 2014).
65   John W. Donaldson, “Paradox of the Moving Boundary: Legal Heredity of River 
Accretion and Avulsion”, 4 Water Alternatives 155 (2011), p. 155.
66   See ibid., pp. 155-169.
67   Application for Revision and Subsidiary Interpretation of the Award of 21 Octo-
ber 1994 Submitted by Chile (Argentina/Chile), Decision, 22 RIAA 151 (13 October 
1995), para. 58.
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the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission specified that the boundary 
“will move in accordance with any change in position of the middle of 
the main channel [of several river sections]”.68 As a result, any change 
in the course of the main channel of the river sections would correspond 
directly to a change in the land boundary between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
Changes in the course of a river can also affect maritime boundaries 
because, in cases where the land boundary is based on the course of the 
river, the starting point for the maritime delimitation is often, though 
not always, selected to be the land boundary terminus. As a result, a 
change in the course of the river could have a significant impact on the 
delimitation line, particularly in the first stage where the provisional 
equidistance line is drawn. This can be seen most prominently in 
Nicaragua/Honduras, where the ICJ held that “the delta of the River 
Coco and even the coastline north and south of it show a very active 
morpho-dynamism”,69 leading the Court to conclude that “in the current 
case it is impossible for the Court to identify base points and construct 
a provisional equidistance line”,70 such that it decided to apply the so-
called angle bisector delimitation method rather than the equidistance 
method.71
D. CHANGES IN SEA LEVELS
The third event is a change in sea levels—most often a rise, but 
for some parts of the world can be a fall. Sea level changes can cause 
movements in land boundaries. For example, in a case where sea level 
rise affects a river that forms a boundary between two States, and the 
boundary is defined based on the high-water or low-water levels of the 
river (rather than, for example, the thalweg of the river), sea level rise 
can cause the land boundary to move.
Changes in sea levels, however, could have a more dramatic impact 
on maritime boundaries. The primary reason is that changing sea levels 
68   Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, PCA Case No 2001-01, Demarcation In-
structions, 25 RIAA 225 (22 August 2003), p. 228, para. 20.
69   Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Carib-
bean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, [2007] ICJ Reports 659 (8 October 
2007), para. 32.
70   Ibid., para. 280.
71   Ibid., para. 287.
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could affect the status of maritime features. Rising sea levels could 
change a fully entitled island to a rock to a low-tide elevation to a 
submerged elevation, whereas falling sea levels could lead to changes 
in the opposite direction. The change in the status of maritime features 
could affect maritime entitlements, relevant coasts, and base points, 
thereby impacting relevant areas and provisional equidistance lines, 
and ultimately final delimitation lines.
Changing sea levels could also impact maritime delimitations in 
other ways. They could impact the general direction of coasts, affecting 
the drawing of straight baselines.72 They could cause coastal land area 
to recede (with rising sea levels) or expand (with falling sea levels), 
affecting the baseline and thus the extent of the coastal State’s maritime 
entitlements.
E. CHANGES IN MARITIME DELIMITATION LAW
The fourth and final event is changes in the law governing maritime 
delimitation. Maritime delimitation law has evolved significantly 
over the past few decades, and may continue evolve over the coming 
decades. As a result, the delimitation of a maritime boundary effected 
thirty years ago may differ from the delimitation of the same maritime 
boundary effected today, which may differ from the delimitation of the 
same maritime boundary effected thirty years from now. The question is 
whether this change in the law should justify a change in the delimitation 
line.
One key example is the movement from a natural prolongation-
based approach to a purely geographic approach to continental shelf 
delimitations. In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 1969, the 
ICJ held that “the rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of 
continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land 
territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio”.73 At the 
time, many States concluded continental shelf delimitation treaties that 
relied on this notion. For example, in 1969, Indonesia and Malaysia 
concluded a treaty delimiting their continental shelf with a line that 
72   UNCLOS (note 26), art. 7(3).
73   North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany/Denmark; Germany/Netherlands), Judg-
ment, [1969] ICJ Rep 3 (20 February 1969), p. 22.
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was closer to Indonesia than Malaysia because the natural prolongation 
of Malaysia’s continental shelf extended further.74 And two years later, 
Indonesia and Australia concluded a treaty delimiting their continental 
shelf that also placed the line closer to Indonesia for the same reason.75 
Today, however, if these maritime areas were to be delimited through 
adjudication, the court or tribunal would begin with a provisional 
equidistance line, and the natural prolongation of the two States’ 
continental shelves would not be a relevant factor in drawing the final 
delimitation line. Nevertheless, this new reality has not led to the 
termination of the many continental shelf delimitation treaties based on 
natural prolongation. 
V. CONCLUSION
As mentioned above in Section III, the concern for stability is 
weaker for maritime boundaries than it is for land boundaries. And as 
seen in Section IV, the concern for adaptability is stronger for maritime 
boundaries than it is for land boundaries, particularly in light of the 
four subsequent events examined in detail above. As a result, a cogent 
argument can be made that the law governing maritime boundaries 
should not necessarily favour stability over adaptability as much as the 
law governing land boundaries.
This does not, however, necessarily lead to the conclusion that the 
legal rules discussed in Section II.B—pacta sunt servanda, Article 
62(2)(a), res judicata, and uti possidetis—should not apply to maritime 
boundaries. It could be the case that, even though the concern for stability 
is weaker and the concern for adaptability is stronger for maritime 
boundaries when compared to land boundaries, the concern for stability 
still outweighs the concern for adaptability on an absolute level, even 
for maritime boundaries. As a result, it may still be justified for the legal 
74   Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Govern-
ment of Malaysia Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelves between the 
Two Countries (signed 27 October 1969, entered into force 7 November 1969) 9 ILM 
1173.
75   Agreement between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia Establishing Certain Seabed Boundaries 
(signed 18 May 1971, entered into force 8 November 1973) 974 UNTS 307.
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rules discussed in Section II.B to apply to maritime boundaries.
If, however, the international community continues to accept the 
application of the aforementioned legal rules to maritime boundaries, 
then it must recognize the consequences that would result. Three in 
particular are mentioned here.
First, there is the possibility that “absurd” situations could arise. 
This can be seen most clearly in the hypothetical Crimea and Strait of 
Singapore situations discussed in Section I. A maritime boundary may 
be delimited on the basis of facts that no longer exist.
Second, in light of such “absurd” situations, States may challenge 
the legitimacy of these maritime boundaries. This can lead to conflict 
between States, and ultimately instability in the maritime border areas. 
For the moment, however, this does not appear to be the case. For 
example, as mentioned in Section IV.E, many old treaties delimiting 
continental shelves favour one State over another because they were 
based on natural prolongation, but the disadvantaged States have not 
challenged the validity of these treaties on the basis of an evolution in 
maritime delimitation law.
Third, States may have a strategic incentive to delimit their maritime 
boundaries earlier or later. For example, if rising sea levels are causing 
a State’s coasts to recede, the State would be incentivized to delimit its 
maritime boundaries earlier. On the other hand, if falling sea levels are 
causing a State’s coasts to expand, the State would be incentivized to 
delimit its maritime boundaries later, or possibly never. The latter would 
be problematic if one believes that boundaries should be delimited as 
soon as possible for international peace and security.
One way of mitigating these consequences, at least for negotiated 
treaty boundaries, is to take foreseeable subsequent events into account 
when determining the boundary line. That is, the treaty could expressly 
state that it would remain in force regardless of changes in geography 
or maritime delimitation law. Alternatively, the treaty could expressly 
state that the boundary line will adapt to changing circumstances in 
a particular fashion. For example, in the recently concluded maritime 
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boundary treaty between Timor-Leste and Australia, Article 3 specifies 
certain adjustments in the boundary that would result if Timor-Leste 
and Indonesia reach an agreement on their continental shelf boundary.76
All in all, this Article does not have any specific normative 
recommendations. However, it is the hope of the present author that 
greater attention be paid to the facts that maritime boundaries and land 
boundaries have some fundamental differences, that the law governing 
land boundaries may not necessarily be appropriate for maritime 
boundaries, and that there are subsequent events that could potentially 
justify moving maritime boundaries.
76   Treaty between Australia and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Establish-
ing Their Maritime Boundaries in the Timor Sea (signed 6 March 2018).
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